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ARTICLES

The Misuse of Reasonable Royalty Damages
as a Patent Infringement Deterrent
Brian J. Love*
This Article studies the Federal Circuit's use of excessive reasonable
royalty awards as a patent infringement deterrent. I argue against this practice, explaining that, properly viewed in context of the patent system as a
whole, distorting the reasonable royalty measure of damages is an unnecessary and ineffective means of ensuring an optimal level of rewardfor inventors and deterrencefor infringers. First,I introduce cases in which the Federal Circuit and other courts following its lead have awardedpunitive reasonable royalty awards and explain the Federal Circuit'sprofessed rationale
for doing so. Next, I demonstrate that this practice makes little sense, given
the number of other powerful deterrents alreadypresent in the patent system.
I also explain that any additional deterrence-relatedbenefits attributableto
excess damages are not realized when courts impose those damages against
innocent infringers - a group that likely makes up the lion 's share of patent
infringers. I further explain that there is good reason to believe that the patent system already overdeters infringement without the added burden of inflated royalties, because accused infringers participating in a competitive
market face strong incentives not to challengepatents assertedagainst them.
Finally, I propose several patent reforms for efficiently deterring deliberate
copyists, while sparinginnocent infringersfrom that threat.
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2009-2010; previously an Associate with
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I. INTRODUCTION
Psychologists, economists, and biologists agree that humans feel an instinctive need to punish bad actors - to seek revenge against liars, cheats, and
free riders - regardless of the deterrent effect such retribution has on future
scoundrels.' Although we hope the judges who apply society's laws are capable of rising above such primal desires, are we so sure that judges are different? If U.S. patent law is any indication, the answer is a resounding no.
As this Article demonstrates, the proclivity of jurists and jurors toward justdesserts retribution has had a significant impact on the evolution of how U.S.
patent law treats those found liable for patent infringement.
This Article documents the striking fact that courts have time and again
awarded reasonable royalty damages for patent infringement that rise well

1. See Benedict Carey, Citizen Enforcers Take Aim at Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 7, 2008, at Dl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/07/health/07ihtpunish.1.16744325.html. For a broader discussion of the psychology of retaliation
and forgiveness, see MICHAEL E. MCCULLOUGH, BEYOND REVENGE: THE EVOLUTION
OF THE FORGIVENESS INSTINCT (2008).
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above any objectively "reasonable" level for the apparent purpose of punishing defendants for their infringing conduct.2 Numerous cases demonstrate
that the Federal Circuit is more than willing to award inflated reasonable
royalties - at times enhanced by an order of magnitude or more 3 - to ensure
that patentees receive what the court deems an appropriate level of recovery,
punish infringers, and deter those who might choose to infringe in the future.
Although this practice may be commendable in intent 4 and supported by simple intuitive appeal, 5 when considered in context of the patent system as a
whole, distorting the reasonable royalty measure of damages is a needless
(indeed, almost certainly counterproductive) and ineffective means of ensuring an optimal level of reward for inventors and deterrence for infringers.
This Article explores the inflation of reasonable royalty awards and concludes that this practice simply makes no sense in a patent system that already

2. Several commentators have noted, at least in passing, that the Federal Circuit
has added a deterrence function to the reasonable royalty measure of damages. See
Mark A. Lemley, DistinguishingLost Profitsfrom Reasonable Royalties, 51 William
& Mary L. Rev. (forthcoming Nov. 2009) (manuscript at 6-13) [hereinafter Distinguishing Lost Profits] ("[T]he Federal Circuit ... has also approved of discretionary
increases in the reasonable royalty designed to avoid undercompensation, and there is
reason to believe that courts continue to award relatively high reasonable royalties
and to distort the concept of a hypothetical negotiation between willing buyers and
willing sellers .... " (footnotes omitted)); Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin:
Incentives to Innovation in the New Economy of Intellectual PropertyLaw, 46 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 307, 336 (2006) ("Although [35 U.S.C.] § 284 ... mandates that the
reasonable royalty award be that which is 'adequate to compensate for the infringement,' some courts have built a deterrence function into the reasonable royalty calculation that permits considerable upward movement from the market value of the use
of the invention at the time of infringement." (footnote omitted)).
3. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1555, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(affirming district court's award of reasonable royalty, which, according to the dissent, was "[thirty-three] times greater than [the infringer's] net profit on its entire
machine"); Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1379, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (affirming jury verdict of reasonable royalty more than eleven times greater than technology fee plaintiff charged farmers for license to plant patented soybean seeds and
reasonable royalty almost five times greater than fee plaintiff charged for license to
plant patented cottonseed). See also Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 977
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (affirming similar jury verdict of reasonable royalty more than six
times greater than technology fee plaintiff charged for license to plant patented soybean seeds).
4. For a discussion of why courts inflate reasonable royalty awards, see infra
Part II.D.
5. See Carl Shapiro, Patent Reform: Aligning Reward and Contribution, in 8
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 111, 115 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2008),
available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10778.pdf (noting that, though incorrect,
it is intuitive to assume that the patent system generally undercompensates inventors
because "many inventions generate positive externalities, generally known as spillovers" that might not be reflected in patent rewards).
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consistently overvalues patent rights compared to their value to society, especially when courts mete out this punishment to innocent and willful infringers
alike. Part I1 explores cases in which the Federal Circuit and other courts
following its lead have awarded increased reasonable royalty awards for punitive impact and explains the Federal Circuit's professed rationale for doing
so. Part III demonstrates that this practice makes little sense, given the number of other powerful deterrents already present in the patent system. Part IV
explains that, to the extent they exist at all, any deterrence-related benefits
resulting from excess damages do not materialize when courts impose those
damages against innocent infringers - a group that likely makes up the lion's
share of patent infringers. Part V argues that, even without the additional
burden of inflated damages awards, there is good reason to believe that the
patent system already over deters infringement because accused infringers
participating in a competitive market face strong incentives not to challenge
patents asserted against them. Finally, Part VI outlines proposed patent reforms for efficiently deterring willful copyists, while sparing ordinary, innocent infringers from that threat.

II. DETERRING INFRINGEMENT WITH
REASONABLE ROYALTY AWARDS
Although traditional black-letter patent law states that damages for patent infringement are intended only to compensate patent owners, the Federal
Circuit has shaped the law of reasonable royalty damages to incorporate an
additional deterrent function. This Part introduces cases in which courts have
awarded enhanced reasonable royalty awards to deter infringers and explains
why courts believe this is necessary.
A. BriefIntroduction to Patent InfringementDamages
Section 284 of the United States Patent Act states that a patentee may
recover profits lost due to infringement, "but in no event less than a reasonable royalty" for an infringer's use of the patented invention. 6 According to
the statute, courts should aim to award "damages adequate 7to compensate"
the patentee for losses it sustained as a result of infringement.
This compensation may take the form of lost profits, a reasonable royalty, or a combination thereof 8 For many patentees, however, proving lost

6. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). Typically, courts also award injunctive relief under
35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006), prohibiting infringers from continuing their infringing activities for the duration of the patent's term. This remedy is discussed infra at Part III.A.
7. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
8. See, e.g., Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 95 F.3d 1109, 1119 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) ("The Patent Act permits damages awards to encompass both lost profits
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profits is not a realistic goal. 9 To obtain lost profits, a patentee must show (i)
consumer demand for a product it sells that is covered by the patent-atissue, 10 (ii) sufficient marketing and manufacturing capacity to exploit that
demand, (iii) an absence of noninfringing substitutes that might satisfy that
demand instead, and (iv) the dollar amount of profit that it would have made
from additional sales of its product had the infiinger's product never entered
the market."
Patentees who cannot establish all prongs of the above test - frequently
because they do not sell a product, let alone one covered by their patent may not recover lost profits. These patent owners may recover as damages
only the reasonable royalty for which they could have licensed their patent to
the infringer. In setting this reasonable royalty rate, courts attempt to reconstruct the hypothetical bargain that the parties would have negotiated had they
willingly tried to do so at the time infringement began. 12 To recreate this
"willing licensor-willing licensee" royalty, courts generally rely on fifteen
3
factors set forth in Georgia-PacificCorp. v. United States Plywood Corp'
and a reasonable royalty on that portion of an infringer's sales not included in the lost
profit calculation.").
9. Indeed, Mark Lemley argues that the Federal Circuit's willingness to inflate
reasonable royalty awards may be a consequence of this fact. See DistinguishingLost
Profits, supra note 2, at 11-12 (arguing that courts often increase reasonable royalty
awards to benefit patentees the courts believe should have received - but did not receive - lost profits awards).
10. Although it is generally true that a patentee may obtain lost profits damages
only for foregone sales of products covered by the patent-at-issue, this is not always
the case. Courts have allowed damages for a patentee's lost sales of products that,
although not covered by the asserted patent, competed with the infringer's product.
See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1544-50 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding
that a patentee is entitled to lost profits damages based on foregone sales of products
not covered by the patent-in-suit, but which compete with the infringing product,
because such losses are the foreseeable result of infringement); see also King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941,951-53 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
11. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th
Cir. 1978).
12. Id.at 1157-58 ("A reasonable royalty is an amount which a person, desiring
to manufacture and sell a patented article, as a business proposition, would be willing
to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make and sell the patented article, in the market,
at a reasonable profit." (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Overman Cushion
Tire Co., 95 F.2d 978, 984 (6th Cir. 1937))). This ex post recreation of the hypothetical bargain that the parties would have struck had they negotiated is essentially a form
of restitution-style contract law damages. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN
FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW & POLICY: CASES & MATERIALS 1077-78 n.2 (3d
ed. 2002).
13. 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The factors are
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in
suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty. 2. The rates paid
by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the patent in
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The exercise of reconstructing the parties' hypothetical ex ante bargain is,
unfortunately, by no means one of careful economic analysis - nor is it undertaken on a level playing field. Instead, it relies upon counterfactual assumptions designed to favor the patentee and ensure adequate compensation.
Namely, though ostensibly setting royalty rates at the level parties would
have negotiated prior to suit, courts presume that the patent-at-issue is valid
and infringed 4 - both facts that were no doubt fiercely contested during litigation and far from clear when infringement began.
suit. 3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive;
or as restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to
whom the manufactured product may be sold. 4. The licensor's established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent monopoly by
not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly. 5. The commercial
relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as whether they are
competitors in the same territory in the same line of business; or whether
they are inventor and promoter. 6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products of the licensee; that existing
value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of his nonpatented items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed sales. 7.
The duration of the patent and the term of the license. 8. The established
profitability of the product made under the patent; its commercial success;
and its current popularity. 9. The utility and advantages of the patent
property over the old modes or devices, if any, that had been used for
working out similar results. 10. The nature of the patented invention; the
character of the commercial embodiment of it as owned and produced by
the licensor; and the benefits to those who have used the invention. 11.
The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any
evidence probative of the value of that use. 12. The portion of the profit
or of the selling price that may be customary in the particular business or
in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the invention or analogous inventions. 13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be
credited to the invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the
manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer. 14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts. 15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee
(such as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an
agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent licensee - who desired, as
a business proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the patented invention - would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and
which amount would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was
willing to grant a license.
Id. at 1120.
14. See St. Clair Intellectual Prop. Consultants, Inc. v. Canon, Inc., No. Civ.A.
03-241 JJF, 2004 WL 2213562, at *3 (D.Del. Sept. 28, 2004) ("Cases clearly accept
that the hypothetical negotiation for calculating a reasonable royalty is based on the
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B. PatentDamages as Pecuniary Compensation
Given that the Patent Act expressly calls for patent damages that are
"adequate to compensate for the infringement," 15 it should come as no surprise that patent law traditionally provides that the core purpose of reasonable
royalty damages is to compensate the patentee by awarding as damages a
royalty fee approximating the true market value of a license to practice the
patented invention.
More than 120 years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court defined patent damages as "the difference between [the patentee's] pecuniary condition after the
infringement, and what his condition would have been if infringement had not
occurred."' 16 Only a few years later, the Court explicitly stressed the compensatory nature of patent damages and rejected the notion that damages awarded
under the Patent Act should function to punish infringers: "[patent damages]
have been defined by this Court as 'compensation for the pecuniary loss he
(the patentee) has suffered from the infringement, without regardto.the question whether the defendant has gainedor lost by his unlawful acts."".7
When infringement does not divert sales from the patentee (for example,
because the patentee does not sell a product), the patentee's pecuniary loss is

assumption that the patent was valid and infringed."); DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM
ON PATENTS § 20.03 (7th ed. 2006) ("The [hypothetical reasonable royalty] negotiation is based on the assumption that the patent was valid."). There is good reason to
believe that this presumption is necessary to avoid undercompensating patentees. See
discussion infra Part I.B; ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F. COTTER, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 229-30

(2005) ("The presumption [that the patent-at-issue is valid in the hypothetical negotiation] nevertheless makes economic sense, because an award that reflected the parties'
uncertainty at the time of the hypothetical negotiations in effect would require the
plaintiff to bear the risk of uncertainty twice: first, at the time of those negotiations,
and second when deciding whether to proceed to trial."); Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh
K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085,
1109-12 (2003); see also infra note 142 and accompanying text.
15. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). See also CHISUM, supra note 14, at § 20.01 ("The
goal of the law of monetary relief for patent infringement is to provide full compensation to the owner of a patent."). This is not to say that the Patent Act provides no
mechanism for deterrence. Indeed, several provisions of the Patent Act were designed specifically to deter infringers. These deterrents are discussed infra at Part
III.A.
16. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507
(1964) (quoting Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536, 552 (1886)). See also
CHISUM, supra note 14, at § 20.01 ("The primary award should be the best approximation of the amount necessary to restore the owner to the financial position he
would have enjoyed had the infringer not engaged in unauthorized acts in violation of
the owner's exclusive patent rights.").
17. Aro, 377 U.S. at 507 (quoting Coupe v. Royer, 155 U.S. 565, 582 (1895))
(emphasis added).
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limited to the royalty fee that it could have reasonably charged the infringer
for a license to use the patent-at-issue. Reconstruction of that royalty amount
as determined by the market value of the patented invention, then,
is the tradi8
damages.,
royalty
reasonable
calculating
of
tional sine qua non
C. Inflation of the ReasonableRoyalty Measure of Damages
Courts nevertheless appear to be routinely dissatisfied with the royalty
rates that simple economic evidence shows the parties would have agreed to
in a negotiation prior to infringement. In such situations, courts have often
awarded grossly inflated royalty rates, implicitly rejecting Supreme Court and
previously well-established Federal Circuit precedent setting forth a strictly
compensatory reasonable royalty formulation.
This practice is perhaps best embodied by a recent line of cases between
Monsanto and farmers who purchased Monsanto's patented seeds. In Monsanto Co. v. McFarling,the Federal Circuit affirmed a jury award of reasonable royalty damages more than six times the licensing fee the patentee, Monsanto, consistently charged for use of the patented invention.19 In that case,
18. In fact, the Georgia-Pacificfactors are essentially economic considerations
designed to aid courts in determining the amount the patentee could and would have
charged the infringer for use of the patented invention. See generally Landers, supra
note 2, at 325-28.
Absent holdup (and ignoring for the moment the possibility that the patent-atissue might be invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed), we would expect parties
negotiating a royalty to divide the surplus created by the patented invention. See
Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEx. L.
REv. 1991, 1999-2000 (2007) [hereinafter Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking] (developing a numerical model for "a benchmark level for the royalty rate, i.e., the royalty rate that would be reasonable and expected in the ideal patent system without any
element of holdup"). Mathematically, a freely negotiated royalty is represented by
the equation B*V, where V represents the value of the patented invention to the infringing firm and B represents the relative bargaining power between the parties. ld.
at 1996-97. For example, if a patented invention improves the efficiency of a manufacturing process, resulting in a cost savings of $10 per unit above the next best noninfringing alternative (i.e., V = $10), and the patentee and accused infringer bargain
from positions of equal power (i.e., B = 0.5), we would expect the parties to reach a
royalty of $5 per unit (i.e., 0.5*$10 = $5), evenly dividing the infringer's gains from
using the patented invention. See Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d
1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (affirming royalty award calculated as one-third of the
cost savings attributable to the patented invention).
19. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling (McFarlingIIl), 488 F.3d 973, 977-81 (Fed. Cir.
2007). McFarling appealed to the Federal Circuit three times. See id.; Monsanto Co.
v. McFarling (McFarling 11), 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Monsanto Co. v.
McFarling (McFarling1), 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The case finally ended
when the U.S. Supreme Court denied McFarling's petition for certiorari from the
Federal Circuit's decision in McFarling III. McFarling v. Monsanto Co., 128 S. Ct.
871 (2008).

HeinOnline -- 74 Mo. L. Rev. 916 2009

2009]

THE MISUSE OF REASONABLE ROYAL TY DAMAGES

917

Monsanto brought suit against a Mississippi farmer who purchased (and later
saved and replanted) genetically modified seeds that grow into herbicide resistant crops. 20 Monsanto sold its patented seeds through distributors and
required purchasers to sign a "Technology Agreement," which licensed two
patents Monsanto owned covering the genetic modification. 2 1 This agreement limited use of the purchased seeds to a single growing season. 22 It also
required buyers to pay Monsanto a $6.50 per bag "Technology Fee" to license the patents and to pay the seed distributor another fee of between $19
and $22 per bag. 23 When the jury returned a damages verdict in Monsanto's
favor of $40 per bag - more than six times the license fee Monsanto consistently charged farmers24 and, indeed, 140% of the total purchase price of the
25
seeds - McFarling appealed.
The Federal Circuit affirmed, reasoning that
evidence in the record showed that using Monsanto's seeds saved farmers
between $31 and $61 per bag and, therefore, it was not unreasonable for the
jury to conclude that a farmer would be willing to pay a royalty of $40 per

bag.26

The court stressed that limiting damages to Monsanto's customary

On virtually identical facts, the Federal Circuit affirmed an even larger jury verdict in Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1382-84 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In Ralph,
the jury awarded reasonable royalty damages of more than eleven times the licensing
fee Monsanto charged at the time to plant modified soybean seeds (e.g., a royalty of
$55.04 per bag replanted in 1999 when Monsanto's Technology Agreement called for
a $5.00 license fee) and an award of almost five times the licensing fee for modified
cottonseed (e.g., a royalty of $548.00 per bag replanted in 1999 when Monsanto's
Technology Agreement called for a $112.80 license fee). Id.at 1379. To make matters worse, the district court also trebled the total amount of patent infringement damages for willful infringement. Id.at 1379.
20. McFarlingIII, 488 F.3d at 976.
21. Id. Monsanto owns two patents, U.S. Patent Nos. 5,633,435 and 5,352,605,
that cover the genetic modification of these seeds. Id. The modified plants resist
glyphosphate herbicide, a characteristic that allows farmers to spray an entire field
with herbicide to efficiently eliminate weeds without harming the resistant crops. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *12, McFarling v. Monsanto Co., No. 07241, 2007 WL 2406828 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2007) ("Every soybean farmer who planted
Monsanto's genetically modified soybeans - more than 90% of the soybean farmers
in the country - paid Monsanto the same $6.50-per-bag Technology Fee for those
rights." (internal citation omitted)).
25. McFarlingIi, 488 F.3d at 977.
26. Id. at 981. Ironically, although the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court's $375,000 reasonable royalty award in McFarling III, three years earlier in
McFarling H the Federal Circuit vacated the district court's parallel award of
$780,000 in damages for breach of contract as "grossly disproportionate to the loss
that Monsanto actually suffered in loss of technology fees due to McFarling's replanting of saved seeds." Monsanto Co. v. McFarling (McFarling II), 363 F.3d 1336,
1345 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The court went so far as to state that Monsanto's argument
that a multiplier was necessary to prevent McFarling from "gain[ing] a competitive
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license fee - and, apparently, even to the entire retail purchase price of the
seed - "would create a windfall for infringers like McFarling" who "would
have a huge advantage over other farmers who took the standard .. . li27
cense."
In doing so, however, the Federal Circuit engaged in just the sort of reasoning the Supreme Court has consistently rejected. The Federal Circuit
failed to focus on particularly compelling evidence of "the pecuniary loss he
(the patentee) has suffered from the infringement ''28 - i.e., the unpaid Technology Fee 29 - and instead justified the large reasonable royalty award on the
sort of evidence the Supreme Court held the Patent Act mandated courts ig30
nore - "whether the defendant has gained or lost by his unlawful acts."
This sort of reasoning - stressing that infringers must not be permitted to
benefit from their infringement - sounds squarely in deterrence, not compensation for actual pecuniary loss.
Nor is this an isolated example. The Federal Circuit has, in fact, affirmed damages awards that contain far more flagrant enhancements aimed at
boosting the reasonable royalty measure of damages. In Maxwell v. J. Baker,
Inc., the Federal Circuit approved a jury verdict of almost double what,
strangely enough, the jury itself found to be a reasonable royalty. 31 In that
case, the jury awarded reasonable royalty damages of over $1.5 million (a
$0.05 per pair royalty applied to thirty-one million infringing pairs of shoes)
for infringement of a patented system for fastening two mated shoes together
to prevent their separation before sale. 32 In response to special interrogatories
the district court included in the jury charge, the jury went on to award an
additional$1.5 million in damages after finding that the patentee was injured
by that amount "in excess of the amount of a reasonable royalty." 33 In an
apparent change of heart for a court that held just three months before in Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard,Inc. that it was an abuse of discretion for a district court

advantage in the marketplace" was "inimical to the compensatory nature of contract
remedies: it sounds in deterrence, not compensation, and therefore suggests that the
multiplier is in the nature of a penalty clause rather than a liquidated damages clause."
Id. at 1351.
27. McFarling111, 488 F.3d at 980.
28. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507
(1964) (quoting Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536, 552 (1886)).
29. In the court's view, this also included the fee paid to the seed distributors,
which the court considered to be a portion of Monsanto's license fee that the company
allocated to the distributors. McFarling111, 488 F.3d at 979-80. Yet, even combining
the two fees, the jury's award of $40 per bag exceeds the $28.50 maximum per bag
total "license" Monsanto charged by over 40%.
30. Coupe v. Royer, 155 U.S. 565, 582 (1895).
31. 86 F.3d 1098, 1108-11 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
32. Id.at 1101-02, 1108.
33. Id.at 1109 (quoting the district court's jury charge).

HeinOnline -- 74 Mo. L. Rev. 918 2009

2009]

THE MISUSE OFREASONABLE ROYALTY DAMAGES

919
34

to award "additional damages or a 'kicker' on top of a reasonable royalty,
the J. Baker court affirmed the use of an additional jury instruction seemingly
designed to provide the jury with the opportunity to do just that. Hinting at
the importance of other, non-compensatory functions of patent damages, the
court reasoned that a finder of fact calculating a reasonable royalty should
consider not only a hypothetical negotiation between the parties but also
"other factors that might warrant higher damages.",3 5 Accordingly, the court
held, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to instruct the jury
to award in two separate amounts - "first... the royalty that two willing parties would negotiate ... [and] second . . . the increase in the damages...
based on other relevant factors" - what courts had previously instructed jurors to consolidate into a single damages award.36
Courts have also awarded inflated royalties as equitable relief for postverdict infringement in cases where a permanent injunction was not warranted or did issue but was stayed pending appeal. For example, though it
declined to issue a permanent injunction, the district court in Paice LLC v.
Toyota Motor Corp. imposed an ongoing royalty for Toyota's post-verdict
infringement almost four times greater than the reasonable royalty the jury
awarded at trial for pre-verdict infringement. 37 Suggesting it was motivated
by deterrence-related concerns, the Paice court stressed that "[a]nything less

34. 79 F.3d 1572, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that the district court abused
its discretion by adding an additional 9% "Panduit kicker" - apparently designed to
offset the patentee's litigation expenses - on top of a 25.88% reasonable royalty
award following a bench trial on damages).
35. J.Baker, 86 F.3d at 1109.
36. Id. at 1110. When the same pateritee later brought suit against another shoe
manufacturer, the Central District of California - following the Federal Circuit's lead
in J. Baker - approved a jury award of a $0.06 per pair "reasonable royalty" plus
"additional damage[s]" of $0.15 per pair. Maxwell v. Angel-etts of Cal., No.
CV9910516DT(AJWX), 2001 WL 34133507, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2001). In denying the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law on damages, the court
explained that "[i]n Maxwell v. J. Baker, the Federal Circuit explained that the factfinder must consider evidence of 'additional factors' to assist in the determination of
adequate compensation." Id.at *8. The court held that the jury's award of additional
damages was justified to "protect[] against ... blatant misappropriation of patented
inventions" - a practice which in this case "contributed to industry-wide lack of respect for Maxwell's patent." Id.at *9. The court further enhanced the patentee's
award by doubling her damages for willful infringement and awarding attorneys' fees.
Id.at *25-26.
37. 609 F. Supp. 2d 620, 624-31 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (awarding an ongoing royalty
of $98 per vehicle for post-verdict infringement, even though the jury awarded a reasonable royalty of only $25 per vehicle for pre-verdict infringement).
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would be manifestly unjust" because
"Toyota is an adjudged infringer who
38
chooses to continue infringing."
In larger context, the cases described above are part of an ongoing trend
in patent law nudging the reasonable royalty formulation further and further
away from the traditional willing licensor-willing licensee negotiation and,
therefore, from representing the market value of the patented invention. Despite traditional principles to the contrary, courts have increasingly held that,
in setting reasonable royalties, finders of fact are not bound by the economic
realities of the marketplace. For example, courts have long held that "established" royalties for the patent-at-issue - that is, uniform royalty amounts
collected prior to infringement from "such a number of persons as to indicate
a general acquiescence in its reasonableness" 39 - generally control in setting
reasonable royalty damages. 40 After all, absent changed circumstances, no
prospective licensee would offer to pay a royalty greater than the standard
royalty the patentee requested from all its licensees. Nonetheless, courts now
frequently stray upward from established, industry-wide licensing practices,
holding that such royalties "do not necessarily establish a ceiling for the
royalty that may be assessed after an infringement trial.",4' In Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., the Federal Circuit noted that
"the industry royalty rate runs from three to ten percent of sales" yet affirmed
the jury's award of a reasonable royalty "approach[ing] one third of the selling price" of the accused product. 4 2 Similarly, in Bott v. FourStar Corp., the

38. Id. at 630. Though vacating the specific award at issue, the Federal Circuit
implicitly approved the imposition of enhanced royalty rates for post-verdict infringement in Amado v. Microsoft Corp. 517 F.3d 1353, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
39. Rude v. Westcott, 130 U.S. 152, 165 (1889).
40. See, e.g., Clark v. Wooster, 119 U.S. 322, 326 (1886) ("It is a general rule in
patent causes that established license fees are the best measure of damages that can be
used."); Nickson Indus., Inc. v. Rol Mfg. Co., 847 F.2d 795, 798 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
("Where an established royalty exists, it will usually be the best measure of what is a
'reasonable' royalty."). In fact, several cases suggest that, if one exists, courts must
award damages in the amount of an established royalty rather than using the hypothetical negotiation model. See, e.g., Marvel Specialty Co. v. Bell Hosiery Mills, Inc.,
386 F.2d 287, 292 (4th Cir. 1967) (holding that evidence of the infringer's profits had
no "relevance to a reasonable royalty [because] [t]here was in this case an established
royalty, and inquiry should not have extended beyond it."); Trell v. Marlee Elecs.
Corp., 912 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("A reasonable royalty 'may be based
upon an established royalty, if there is one, or if not upon a hypothetical royalty
resulting from arm's length negotiations between a willing licensor and a willing
licensee."' (quoting Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1078
(Fed. Cir. 1983))).
41. Bio-Rad Labs., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604, 617 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (citing Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 347 n.5 (Ct. Cl. 1977)),
abrogated in part on other grounds by Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52
F.3d 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
42. 739 F.2d at 617.
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Eastern District of Michigan, acting as the finder of fact, awarded a reasonable royalty of 5% of sales, rejecting evidence of an established 3% royalty in
the industry because, unlike other market participants, the patentee was unwilling to license to the infringer.4 3
Perhaps even more troubling, the Federal Circuit has stated that reason-

able royalties are not capped at the level of an infringer's projected profits.
Common sense dictates that no rational party will strike a bargain for more
than its expected profits from the deal. 44 Federal Circuit precedent once rec-

ognized this, holding that it "is implicit" that a reasonable royalty will leave
the infringer with a reasonable profit 45 and that to suggest otherwise would be
"absurd. ' ' 46 However, under recent Federal Circuit precedent, this is no long-

43. 229 U.S.P.Q. 241, 247-48 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (cited with approval by the
Federal Circuit in Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1575 n. 11
(Fed. Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2004)), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 807 F.2d 1567. If its punitive intent was not already clear, the court also
ominously stated that, were it not also awarding lost profits on other sales, "the rate
would be substantially higher." Bott, 229 U.S.P.Q. at 248.
44. This is not to say that an infringer's actual profits should cap reasonable
royalty damages, see Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1577 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (Nies, J., dissenting) ("[An infringer] is not guaranteed a profit, of course, but
anticipated profit is a factor in hypothetical negotiations."), though they may be quite
probative of the infringer's expectations, see id (arguing that evidence of both parties
actual net profits - 6-10% for the patentee and 2.3% for infringer - should have negated the district court's finding "that the dock equipment industry is so lucrative that
net profits in the 50-75[%] range could be anticipated"). To be sure, a licensee's
actual profits may differ considerably from the profits it projected at the time it negotiated the license.
45. Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (quoting Square Liner 3600, Inc. v. Chisum, 691 F.2d 362, 377 (8th Cir. 1982));
see also Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 349 (Ct. Cl. 1977) ("[S]tart
with the infringer's selling price, deduct its costs in order to find its gross profit, then
allocate to the infringer its normal profit, and then end up with the residual share of
the gross profit which can be assigned to the patentee as its royalty."); Panduit Corp.
v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1157-58 (6th Cir. 1978) ("'A reasonable royalty is an amount which a person, desiring to manufacture and sell a patented article, as a business proposition, would be willing to pay as a royalty and yet
be able to make and sell the patented article, in the market, at a reasonable profit."'
(quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Overman Cushion Tire Co., 95 F.2d 978,
984 (6th Cir. 1937)); TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 899 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (affirming reasonable royalty calculated to leave the infringer with an anticipated profit equal to "the industry standard net profit").
46. Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 895 F.2d
1403, 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that the patentee's expert's "opinion that [the
infringer] 'would agree to pay a royalty in excess of what it expected to make in profit' was, in light of all the evidence in this case, absurd."); see also Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d
at 1577 (Nies, J., dissenting) ("It is simply beyond reality to infer that the manage-
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er the law. In Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the court affirmed the
district court's assessment of a reasonable royalty of $31.80 per infringing
unit despite proof that the infringer forecast a mere $8 per unit profit, holding
that "[t]here is no rule that a royalty be no higher than the infringer's net profit margin. ' 47 Likewise, in Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., an en banc Federal
Circuit affirmed a reasonable royalty award that Judge Nies noted in his dissent was "more than the price of [one of the patentee's products], more than
75 percent of the average net sale price of [the infringer's product],
and 33
' 48
times greater than [the infringer's] net profit on its entire machine.
Indeed, Lemley and Shapiro's empirical analysis of reasonable royalties
awarded between 1984 and 2005 bears out that in practice court-awarded
royalties have, on average, exceeded the profit margin across all industries by
5% of sales. 49 As a result, reasonable royalty damages have become so lucra-

ment of [the infringer] would have negotiated a royalty which, it was evident at the
time, would destroy their business and jobs.").
47. 355 F.3d 1327, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo
Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). In Mor-Flo, the Federal Circuit
affirmed a reasonable royalty of 3% of sales despite evidence that the infringer's
actual net profit margin was 2.1% during the seventeen months prior to the issuance
of the patent-at-issue. 883 F.2d at 1576. The Mor-Flo court did not, however, hold
that reasonable royalty damages could exceed the infringer's anticipatedprofits at the
time of infringement. In fact, the language used in the Mor-Flo opinion implicitly
supports placing such a cap on damages: "The determination of a reasonable royalty,
however, is based not on the infringer's profit margin, but on what a willing licensor
and licensee would bargain for at hypothetical negotiations on the date infringement
started" - an amount that would not exceed the net present value of the infringer's
expected future profits. Id.at 1580. Instead, the court reasoned, given that the
patented invention covered an expanding and proven line of products and that the
infringer also profited from collateral sales, that the infringer would have projected
future net profitability exceeding its then-current profit margin on infringing products
alone. Id. at 1580-81; see also Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1577 (Nies, J.,
dissenting) ("Although this court has sanctioned royalty awards that exceeded the infringer's actual
net profits, we have done so only when there was evidence that the infringer actually
anticipatedgreater net profits.").
In Golight, the Federal Circuit took the additional step of holding that a reasonable royalty can exceed even an infringer's profits as forecast at the time of infringement. 355 F.3d at 1338 ($8 per unit was the infringer's "profit forecast for the product" (emphasis added)). The court neither acknowledged that it was extending the
law nor attempted to distinguish its holdings to the contrary in cases such as Lindemann and Hanson. See id.It instead reasoned that the infringer's profit forecast
merely showed what the infringer "might have preferred to pay, which is not the test
for damages." Golight, 355 F.3d at 1338 (citing Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1555).
48. 56 F.3d at 1576 (Nies, J.,
dissenting).
49. Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, supra note 18, at 2034-35 (analyzing
all reasonable royalty damages awards reported in Westlaw between 1982 and February 2005 that could be calculated as a percentage of the sale price of infringing units).
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tive that patentees who are otherwise perfectly capable of proving lost profits
frequently choose to pursue royalties in hopes of a bigger payday.50
D. Heads-I-Win, Tails-You-Lose: Reasonable
Royalties as an InfringementDeterrent
Why have courts increasingly abandoned what were once established
principles, firmly rooted in pecuniary compensation, in favor of punishing
infringers with damages awards far greater than prevailing license rates in the
industry and much more than the "reasonable" royalty the infringer would
have agreed to pay in a hypothetical negotiation? According to the Federal
Circuit and other courts following suit, they do so to deter infringement - that
is, to arm patentees with
a figurative stick to encourage potential infringers to
51
patent.
their
license
Lemley and Shapiro found that reasonable royalty rates averaged 13.1% of sales during their study period - well above the average profit margin ofjust 8.3%. Id.
50. DistinguishingLost Profits, supra note 2, at 12-13.
51. Although the Federal Circuit's reasons for awarding inflated royalties consistently sound in deterrence, the court rarely says so directly and strives to characterize
deterrence-based enhancement as "additional" compensation. Perhaps no quote captures the inherent tension in this line of thought, which both downplays and yet purports to honor the market value of the patented invention, as well as the following
one:
[T]he Patent Act creates an incentive for innovation. The economic rewards during the period of exclusivity are the carrot. The patent owner
expends resources in expectation of receiving this reward. Upon grant of
the patent, the only limitation on the size of the carrot should be the dictates of the marketplace. Section 284 attempts to ensure this result [i.e., a
reward set according to the dictates of the marketplace] by deterring infringers and recouping market value lost when deterrence fails.
King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 950 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
At times, there also appears to be an equitable component to courts' decisions to
award inflated damages. Some courts have justified large royalty awards, in part, by
stating that "[t]he willing licensee/licensor approach must be flexibly applied as a
'device in [the] aid of justice."' TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 900
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (quoting Cincinnati Car Co. v. N.Y. Rapid Transit Corp., 66 F.2d
592, 595 (2d Cir. 1933)).
See also Maxwell v. Angel-etts of Cal., No.
CV9910516DT(AJWX), 2001 WL 34133507, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2001)
("[A]dditional compensation above the 'willing parties' reasonable royalty is required
if the inventor is to have substantial justice."). This line of reasoning appeals not only
to the economics of deterrence but also to broader notions of "fairness" by defending
discretionary increases in damages as a means to achieve "justice" by punishing bad
actors - generally large companies that blatantly copied the inventions of small, nonmanufacturing patentees. See id (noting that the infringer's "actions contributed to
industry-wide lack of respect for [the individual, non-manufacturing patentee's] patent, crippling licensing efforts and creating additional damages"); Fromson v. W.
Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining that the
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When affirming inflated awards, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly expressed fear that, absent considerable upward movement from royalties calculated according to the traditional willing licensor-willing licensee negotiation
model, rational actors will have a strong incentive to infringe when faced
with the choice to either license the patent or misappropriate the technology.52
Referring to this as a "heads-I-win, tails-you-lose" ' 53 or "can't-lose '

54

position

for potential infringers, the Federal Circuit argues that if infringers face nothing more than paying damages after litigation in the same royalty amount
they would have had to pay to license the patent-at-issue in the market, potential infringers will rationally choose to infringe and take their chances in
court.55

Although this argument is correct in principle - that is, a rational actor
will of course choose to incur an uncertain future cost of at most $X over a
certain $X cost now - it is founded on a naively simplistic conception of patent law that ignores virtually every other incentive to potential infringers.
hypothetical willing licensee-willing licensor model for setting reasonable royalties is
"problematic as a mechanism for doing justice to individual, non-manufacturing patentees"), overruled on other grounds by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge
GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2004). However, as I discuss infra at
Part IlIl.A, the Patent Act already provides a built-in mechanism for penalizing blatant, "willful" infringers - especially those who attempt to take advantage of smaller
patentees -with up to treble damages.
52. See Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1996); King
Instruments, 65 F.3d at 951; Fromson, 853 F.2d at 1574-75; TWM Mfg., 789 F.2d at
900; Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Angel-etts of
Cal., 2001 WL 34133507, at *9.
53. Stickle, 716 F.2d at 1563 ("[W]e would add that the trial court may award an
amount of damages greater than a reasonable royalty so that the award is 'adequate to
compensate for the infringement' .. . [T]he infringer would have nothing to lose, and
everything to gain if he could count on paying only the normal, routine royalty noninfringers might have paid. As said by this court in another context, the infringer
would be in a 'heads-l-win, tails-you-lose' position." (quoting Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 (6th Cir. 1978))).
54. J.Baker, 86 F.3d at 1109 ("[T]he use of a willing licensee-willing licensor
model for determining damages 'risks creation of the perception that blatant, blind
appropriation of inventions patented by individual, nonmanufacturing inventors is the
profitable, can't lose course."' (quoting Fromson, 853 F.2d at 1575)).
55. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 53-54; see also Lemley & Tangri, supra

note 14, at 1111 ("The fact that damages in many patent cases will be limited to a
reasonable royalty creates problems of deterrence. Specifically, it may under-deter
willful infringers. A reasonable royalty is the amount an accused infringer would
have had to pay the patentee to license the patent in the first place. In the absence of
treble damages for willful infringement, if a company knows that retroactively paying
a reasonable royalty is the worst that will happen if it is found to infringe, it may be
more willing take its chances in court."). See also Landers, supra note 2, at 336-38;
Richard T. Rapp & Phillip A. Beutel, Patent Damages: Updated Rules on the Road to
Economic Rationality, 572 PRACTISING L. INST. 865, 867-68 (1999).
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The next Part of this Article shows that, to the extent they are even aware of
adverse patent rights, potential infringers face considerable pressure to avoid
and quickly resolve patent disputes.

III. THE RATIONAL INFRINGEMENT MYTH
The Federal Circuit's "heads-l-win, tails-you-lose" model is accurate
only if we take for granted that an infringer actually faces no litigation outcome more harrowing than paying damages in the amount it would have cost
to license the invention ex ante in the marketplace. For a litany of reasons,
this assumption could not be further from the truth. This Part shows that,
even without deterrence-based enhancements, a potential infringer's expected
cost of infringing far exceeds the royalty it could negotiate in the marketplace
because a patentee who successfully proves infringement will almost certainly be entitled to remedies with a collective monetary value far exceeding the
market value of the patented invention.

A. The Willfulness Doctrineand Others
Exist to DeterBlatantInfringers
The most striking reason why the Federal Circuit's "heads-I-win, tailsyou-lose" model is flawed is that patent law already incorporates several deterrents specifically designed to discourage blatant infringement. The most
notable example is found in section 284 of the Patent Act, which expressly
56
authorizes courts to award up to treble damages for patent infringement.
Though the statute fails to specify how to exercise this discretion to enhance
damages, courts routinely multiply damages to punish particularly blatant, or
"willful," acts of infringement under what is known as the "willfulness doc-

trine. 57
While many factors may come into play when determining whether an
infringer's actions merit enhanced damages for willfulness, courts primarily
consider (i) "whether the infringer deliberately copied" the patented invention
and (ii) "whether the infringer ... formed a good-faith belief that [the patent]
was invalid or... not infringed. ' 58 Accordingly, a prospective infringer in
56. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) ("[T]he court may increase the damages up to three
times the amount found or assessed.").
57. See, e.g., In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
("[T]o establish willful infringement, a patentee must show by clear and convincing
evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions
constituted infringement of a valid patent."); Mathis v. Spears, 857 F.2d 749, 754
(Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Provisions for increased damages ... are available as deterrents to
blatant, blind, willful infringement of valid patents.").
58. See, e.g., Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826-27 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(listing factors courts consider when applying the willfulness doctrine) (quoting Bott
v. Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
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the Federal Circuit's so-called "can't-lose" position - i.e., an infringer making the deliberate decision to misappropriate patented technology and force
litigation rather than paying for an ex ante license - would almost certainly
qualify as a willful infringer and face up to treble damages if sued by the
scorned patentee. In other words, to make the rational-infringement decision
the Federal Circuit fears market-level reasonable royalties will facilitate, an
infringer must both be aware of the patentee's rights and, nevertheless,
choose to disregard those rights and deliberately misappropriate the patented
invention. By virtue of these facts, the "rational" infringer now faces the very
real possibility of paying not merely a reasonable royalty but three times that
amount.59 The prospect of exemplary damages, then, renders this so-called
"rational" infringement irrational and the Federal Circuit's "can't-lose" sce60
nario internally inconsistent.
59. In fact, in many of the cases where courts award inflated reasonable royalty
damages, courts also award enhanced damages under the willfulness doctrine. See,

e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1379, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (affirming
district court's award of treble damages under the willfulness doctrine, even though
reasonable royalty damages were already many times larger than patentee's lost
"Technology Fee"); Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 355 F.3d 1327, 1338-39
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (affirming district court's finding of willfulness in addition to its
award of reasonable royalty damages several times larger than the accused infringer's
projected profits); Maxwell v. Angel-etts of Cal., No. CV9910516DT(AJWX), 2001
WL 34133507, at *12-25 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2001) (doubling award for willfulness,
even though "compensatory" damages amount already incorporated "additional damages" more than twice as large as the "reasonable royalty" awarded by the jury).
60. Furthermore, it is worth noting that, in addition to deterring those making a
conscious decision to infringe and force litigation, the willfulness doctrine addresses
the same equitable concerns underlying inflated reasonable royalty awards. See supra
note 51. In several cases, courts have taken into consideration factors such as the
parties' relative sizes and financial conditions when determining how much to enhance damages. See, e.g., Portec, 970 F.2d at 827 ("[O]ther circumstances which
courts appropriately have considered, particularly in deciding on the extent of enhancement, are ...Defendant's size and financial condition."); St. Regis Paper Co. v.
Winchester Carton Corp., 410 F. Supp. 1304, 1309 (D. Mass. 1976) ("This is an appropriate case to award double damages. If defendant were the giant and plaintiff the
small independent, I would make it treble, and if the Court of Appeals should think
my distinction inappropriate, then the award should be treble rather than single.").
Why the Federal Circuit fails to channel its ire at infringers through the willfulness doctrine rather than inflated reasonable royalties is anyone's guess. One possibility is that courts find the willfulness doctrine too narrow or inflexible to be a sufficient deterrent, cf Eric C. Wrzesinski, Comment, Breaking the Law to Break into the
Black: Patent Infringement as a Business Strategy, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv.

193, 206 (2007) (arguing that U.S. patent law does not go far enough to protect patentees from willful infringement), though it is certainly far from true that only the most
culpable infringers are subjected to paying enhanced damages. See Patent Holdup
and Royalty Stacking, supra note 18, at 2037 ("[A]n infringement can be deemed
willful under current law even if the defendant developed its product independently
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In addition, patent law provides a number of other provisions that, like
the willfulness doctrine, courts may use to punish infringers. For example,
under section 283 of the Patent Act, courts may - and do quite frequently
once infringement is established - grant injunctions prohibiting infringers
from practicing the patented invention. 6 1 The prospect of being put out of
business - and losing much or all of the value of investments not readily diverted to other productive uses - may, in many cases, be the most powerful
infringement deterrent of all. Together with a high probability of issuance
after losing on the merits, 6 2 the thought of watching one's fixed investments
sit unused - at least prior to successfully bargaining back the right to practice
the invention from a position of extreme disadvantage (more on this below) serves as a substantial deterrent to infringement, even to those infringers who
63
believe they can avoid exemplary damages.

and without knowledge of the plaintiffs patent."). Even if this is the case, however, it
is no justification for shifting deterrence to an ill-suited area like reasonable royalty
law. As discussed infra at Part VI, the proper solution is to reform willfulness law in
an effort to provide optimal deterrence.
61. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006). Preliminary injunctions are also sometimes available in patent litigation but are quite rare. See generally Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes
Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[C]ourts have over the years developed a reluctance to resort to preliminary injunctions in patent infringement cases,
and have constructed a rather strict standard for the granting of this form of equitable
relief."). Generally, a preliminary injunction may be defeated simply by raising a
good faith challenge to the patentee's infringement claims or to the asserted patent's
validity. See Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 135051 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("If BN raises a substantial question concerning either infringement or validity, i.e., asserts an infringement or invalidity defense that the patentee
cannot prove 'lacks substantial merit,' the preliminary injunction should not issue.").
As discussed further infra, neither is particularly difficult to challenge. See infra note
70 (noting that litigated patents are invalidated 46% of the time and that only about
25% of patent suits are successful).
62. This likelihood may be somewhat on the decline in light of the Supreme
Court's recent decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), at
least when the patentee and infringer are not competitors. See John M. Golden, "Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2113 (2007) ("Since the
Supreme Court issued its opinion in eBay, district courts appear to have consistently
denied permanent injunctions in cases where an infringer has contested the patent
holder's request for such relief and the infringer and patent holder were not competitors"); Paul Janicke, Patent Litigation Remedies: Some Statistical Observations, at 28
(finding that, post-eBay, the rate of denial of permanent injunctions rose from 16% to
25%), http://www.patentsmatter.com/issue/PatentLitigationRemedies-Janicke.ppt#
1 (last visited on Sept. 5, 2009).
63. See Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, supra note 18, at 1993 ("[T]he
threat of an injunction can enable a patent holder to negotiate royalties far in excess of
the patent holder's true economic contribution."); Lemley & Tangri, supra note 14, at
1112 ("The risk of being shut down by an injunction that will render a defendant's
manufacturing investments useless may be a powerful reason not to infringe."). On
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Further - in addition to the obvious deterrent of having to pay one's own
defense costs - the Patent Act provides that courts may award prevailing parties reasonable attorneys' fees "in exceptional cases. '64 Like enhanced damages for willful infringement, attorneys' fees awards exist for the specific
purpose of "deterr[ing] . . . blatant, blind, willful infringement of valid patents., 65 In practice, such awards can become quite substantial. Indeed, in
patent cases of even relatively modest size, attorneys' fees for each litigant
generally reach seven figures. 66 Accordingly, even a relatively small chance
of incurring such a large cost
can have a substantial effect on a potential in67
fringer's decision-making.

B. ReasonableRoyalties Already Incorporatea Premium
The Federal Circuit's "heads-l-win, tails-you-lose" model also fails to
acknowledge that reasonable royalties awarded by even the most marketconscious courts generally exceed those negotiated in the marketplace for a
number of reasons. Even ignoring patent law's built-in deterrents and litigation costs, the expected value of court-awarded royalties alone will place
pressure on accused infringers to eschew litigation and negotiate a settlement
ex ante. As mentioned above, black-letter law ensures that royalty awards are
the other hand, the deterrent effect of a permanent injunction is virtually non-existent
when the patent-at-issue is nearing the end of its term and will likely expire before the
patentee can file suit and prove infringement. See Lemley & Tangri, supra note 14, at
1112.
64. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006).
65. Mathis v. Spears, 857 F.2d 749, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1988). See also Machinery

Corp. of Am. v. Gullfiber AB, 774 F.2d 467, 472 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("'It is not contemplated that the recovery of attorney's fees will become an ordinary thing in patent
suits, but the discretion given the court in this respect, in addition to the present discretion to award triple damages, will discourage infringement of a patent by anyone
thinking that all he would be required to pay if he loses the suit would be a royalty."'
(quoting S. REP. NO. 1503 (1946))).
66. AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW Ass'N, REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY 2007, at 2526 (reporting that the cost of patent litigation can reach $3 million per litigant even if
the case never goes to trial).
67. But cf Golden, supra note 62, at 2133 (arguing that the effect of an accused
infringer's litigation costs on the accused infringer is overstated because the same
costs, although likely much smaller in magnitude for patent infringement plaintiffs,
also pressure patentees to settle prematurely). Courts may also award prejudgment
and post-judgment interest on damages to ensure that victorious patentees recover at
least an approximation of the net present value of the royalty they lost years ago. 28
U.S.C. § 1961 (2006); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 657 (1983)
("[P]rejudgment interest should ordinarily be awarded absent some justification for
withholding such an award ....
). In addition, courts will ordinarily award costs
(other than attorneys' fees) to the prevailing party in any civil litigation as a matter of
course. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1).
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naturally inflated by requiring courts to assume that the patent-at-issue is
valid and infringed when attempting to reconstruct royalty negotiations after
68
In the real world, of course, no prospective licensee would ever
the fact.
make this assumption. As even the Federal Circuit will admit, patents are at
best probabilistic rights: "[a]n honest opinion [as to the validity and scope of
a patent] is more likely to speak of probabilities than certainties.,, 69 Indeed,
statistics show that litigated patents are invalidated almost half the time, and,
ultimately, only about a quarter of patent claims end in victory for the patentee.70 Accordingly, an ex post assumption of validity and infringement heavily favors the patentee, given that, left to their own devices in the marketplace,
we would expect parties to negotiate a royalty discounted by the likelihood
that the patent-at-issue might be invalidated or found not infringed if litiga71
tion ensues.
Furthermore, even when courts fastidiously attempt to reverse-engineer
market rates, there is good reason to believe that the royalties they award will
68. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
69. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 829 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Mark A.
Lemley & Carl Shapiro, ProbabilisticPatents, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2005, at 75,
available at http://www.atypon-link.com/AEAP/doi/pdf/1 0.1257/0895330054048650
[hereinafter ProbabilisticPatents] (explaining that patent rights are properly viewed
as "probabilistic rights").
70. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity
of LitigatedPatents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205, 208 tbl. 1 (1998) (finding that approximately 46% of patents litigated to a final determination (appeal, trial, or summary
judgment) are invalidated); Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 8 tbl.l (2006) (finding that, in cases including
an appeal to the Federal Circuit, patentees ultimately succeed in proving infringement
only 24.4% of the time); see also Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries and Patent
Cases - An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 385-86
(2000) (finding that patentees lose 42% of the time at trial); ARON LEVKO ET AL.,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, A CLOSER LOOK, PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: DAMAGES

AWARDS, SUCCESS RATE AND TIME-TO-TRIAL 8-10 & charts 5A, 5B, 5C, 6 & 7A
(2008), available at http://www.pwc.com/enUS/us/forensic-services/assets/2008-pat
ent litigationstudy.pdf (finding that, between 1995 and 2007, patentees won summary judgment or at trial only 37% of the time).
71. Expanding on the Lemley-Shapiro benchmark royalty model introduced
supra, the royalty we would expect parties to negotiate ex ante, taking into account
uncertainty as to the validity and scope of the patent-at-issue, is given by the equation
B*O*V, where 0 (- [0,1] represents the probability the patent is valid, enforceable,
and infringed. See Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, supra note 18, at 1999-2000;
see also Lemley & Tangri, supra note 14, at 1111 n.76 ("Ex ante royalty negotiations
will take into account the possibility that a patent will be held invalid or not infringed.
A royalty agreement over a valid, infringed patent will tend to produce a significantly
higher royalty rate."). Returning to the example introduced supra in note 18 (i.e.,
where V = $10 and B = 0.5), if the parties estimate there is only a 40% chance that the
patent-at-issue is valid and infringed (i.e., 0 - .4), we would expect them to negotiate
a royalty of $2 per unit (i.e., B*O*V = 0.5*0.4*$10 = $2).
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exceed market-level rates despite their best intentions. As Lemley and Shapiro note, when courts look to the market for guidance, circularity ensures inflated royalties. 72 Because rates negotiated in the marketplace reflect what
recovery a patentee might achieve through litigation, so long as the industrywide expected value of litigation reflects (among other premiums) courts'
willingness to award punitive enhancements, rates freely negotiated between
private parties in the shadow of litigation will reflect that premium too. Accordingly, even if a court looks to industry licensing rates for guidance, the
bargained-for royalties it will consider already incorporate a premium based
on the potential that patentees might receive inflated awards in litigation. 3 In
short, past awards influence current license negotiations, which influence
future awards and so on, each iteration magnifying the premium inherent in
previous "generations" of negotiated and awarded royalties.
Further, the inflationary effect of this circularity is accelerated by the
fact that publicly available royalty information contains a disproportionate
number of large payments. Public data on license agreements is skewed because private settlements of patent disputes are generally kept confidential
unless they are large enough to have a "material" effect on either party's fi74
nancial condition and thus require disclosure under SEC Rule lOb-5.
Therefore, because larger settlements are more likely to be material, they are
more likely to be disclosed and, thus, also more likely to be included in royalty data relied upon by expert witnesses 75 and courts. As a result, it is predominantly the largest negotiated royalties that influence future damages
awards.

72. Patent Holdup andRoyalty Stacking, supra note 18, at 2022.
73. Id. ("Since negotiated royalties reflect a premium based on holdup, so will be
reasonable royalties awarded by the court."). Although Lemley and Shapiro approach
circularity from the opposite viewpoint - i.e., the possibility that patentees' ability to
extract excessive royalties in the marketplace will be reflected in court-awarded royalties and consequently in subsequent negotiated royalties (and so on) - the principle
applies with equal force starting with excessive judicial awards, which will be reflected in negotiated royalties going forward (and so on).
74. Id. at 2022, 2030 & n.83. Thus, experts testifying about damages negotiated
in the marketplace can only opine on royalties exceeding this cut-off. See id.
75. Landers notes that expert testimony on damages is already suspect because
district courts do very little to filter out unreliable economic evidence. See Landers,
supra note 2, at 331 ("[T]here is a significant risk that fact-finders are deciding royalty questions based on patent valuation evidence that lacks a credible basis."). Ironically, courts generally will not exclude damages theories as unsound unless they depart significantly from the so-called "rule of thumb," which suggests that reasonable
royalties should hover around 25% of the infringer's pre-tax profits - a baseline that
itself is arbitrary and not rooted in economic theory. See id. at 332-35.
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C. PatentHoldup
Opportunities for "patent holdup" - i.e., the opportunistic use of patent
rights to extract above-benchmark compensation - also cast doubt on the
Federal Circuit's "heads-l-win, tails-you-lose" model by encouraging accused
infringers to settle quickly at premium rates rather than roll the dice in court
and face what could be catastrophic results.76 One source of holdup power is
patent law doctrines that occasionally allow a patentee to extract compensation for infringers' use of technology the patentee did not invent.
Doctrines like the "entire market value rule" and the "convoyed sales"
doctrine, which import lost-profits-style market exclusion remedies into reasonable royalty analysis, overcompensate patent owners by allowing them to
earn a royalty on value they did not create.77 Under the entire market value
rule, a patentee can recover damages based on the value of an entire complex
product, even though its patent covers only one of that product's components,
if the patentee can establish that one practicing the invention could reasonably anticipate selling the unpatented and patented components together.78 A
patentee can extend its patent rights even further under the "convoyed sales"
doctrine, which allows a patentee to sweep spare parts and other items sold

76. For an overview of current literature on holdup opportunities in the patent
system, see Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1151 nn.3-4 (2009).
77. DistinguishingLost Profits, supra note 2, at 10 ("[T]he Federal Circuit has
even imported the concept of 'convoyed sales' of non-infringing goods to the reasonable royalty context, suggesting that a reasonable royalty must include some compensation to the patentee for the value the defendant obtained from sales of unpatented
goods that would likely have been sold alongside the patented ones. This suffers from
the same flaw as the application of the entire market value rule - it attributes the value
of unpatented technologies to the patent owner in circumstances in which the patent
owner would not have made sales of those technologies, and therefore in which the
infringer would have had to pay to develop or acquire the technology from somewhere else."). See also Brian J. Love, Note, Patentee Overcompensation and the
Entire Market Value Rule, 60 STAN. L. REv. 263, 276-77 (2007) (showing that the
entire market value rule is frequently applied to award patentees royalties on unpatented components that have value independent of the patented invention).
78. DistinguishingLost Profits, supra note 2, at 6. The entire market value rule
allows a patentee to include in its royalty base any component of a complex infringing
product that (i) functions together with the patented invention as part of a single
"functional unit," Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
and (ii) the patentee or its licensee could reasonably anticipate selling along with the
patented invention, Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d
11, 23 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Recently introduced patent reform legislation would, if
enacted, codify the entire market value rule and allow a patentee to base its damages
on the value of an entire infringing product provided its patent is "the predominant
basis for market demand for [that] infringing product or process." S. 515, 11 1th
Cong. §§ 1(a), 4(a) (2009) ("Patent Reform Act of 2009").
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along with the infringing product into the damages base on which the applicable royalty rate will apply. 79 A manufacturer selling a complex product such as a personal computer - that may incorporate hundreds or even thousands of individually patentable components, and moreover may be sold with
any number of related products, can hardly negotiate on equal footing with a
patentee armed with the potential right to collect royalty damages on the infringer's total package - RAM, ROM, chip, keyboard, monitor, and all.80
As suggested above, permanent injunctions also provide patentees with
the power to extract above-market settlements, especially in situations where
the accused infringer has made significant design-specific investments. With
a permanent injunction, a patent owner can totally shut down a defendant's
infringing operations.81 This threat can be quite powerful when an accused
infringer has incurred substantial costs that are specifically related to the patented invention and not easily redeployed to other noninfringing uses. When
negotiating a royalty against such an accused infringer, we would expect the
patent owner to bargain from a particularly strong position by virtue of its
potential right to shut down the accused infringer's business, rendering its
82
invention-specific investments worthless.
In industries requiring significant up-front investment, the threat of an
injunction is quite potent: after an investment of "$3 billion in a new semiconductor fab or $800 million in developing . . . a new drug," an infringer
"can hardly be expected to throw those product-specific investments away
every time the company is confronted with one of the more than two million
patents currently in force in the United States. 83 The holdup power of permanent injunctions is particularly acute when a patentee accuses technology

79. DistinguishingLost Profits, supra note 2, at 6. Courts use various terminology for these items, including "collateral" and "derivative" sales. See, e.g., Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal Equip. Innovations, Inc., 72 F.3d 872, 881 n.8 (Fed. Cir.
1995) ("The expression 'convoyed sales' should preferably be limited to sales made
simultaneously with a basic item; the spare parts here should best be called 'derivative
sales."'); TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 901 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("Where
a hypothetical licensee would have anticipated an increase in sales of collateral unpatented items because of the patented device, the patentee should be compensated accordingly." (emphasis added)). Other courts simply consolidate convoyed sales with
the entire market value rule. See King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 956
(Fed. Cir. 1995) ("When a patentee either seeks damages on an entire machine where
its patent covers only a patented component or seeks damages for lost sales of unpatented goods sold along with a patented device ('convoyed' sales), a patentee must
").
satisfy the entire market value rule ....
80. See Love, supra note 77, at 284-89 (examining personal computers as a case
study under the entire market value rule).
81. See, e.g., Lemley & Tangri, supra note 14, at 112.
82. Id.
83. Id.14 at 1117.
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essential to an industry-wide standard. 84 When standards have become popular and are expected by customers, a patent owner asserting rights covering
that standard can holdup an entire industry of firms, each of which have little
choice but to negotiate with
the patentee because the market will not accept a
85
noninfringing alternative.
Opportunities for holdup are especially troubling because patent prosecution rules make it surprisingly simple for patentees to capture products and
standards introduced into the market well after their patent application was
filed - a practice known as "submarine patent[ing].,86 Essentially, any savvy
patentee can file an application with a broad disclosure and patiently lie in
wait until a competitor introduces a successful product or a standard-setting
organization adopts a standard falling within the scope of the patent's specification. 87 The patentee can then file a continuation application and prosecute
new claims targeting those products. 8 8 The Federal Circuit has even embraced the practice, stating that
there is nothing improper, illegal or inequitable in filing a patent
application for the purpose of obtaining a right to exclude a known
84. See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent
Pools, and Standard-Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 136
(Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001), available at http://www.nber.org/books/jaff01-1
[hereinafter Navigating the Patent Thicket] ("If the standard becomes popular, each
such patent can confer significant market power on its owner, and the standard itself
is subject to hold-up if these patent holders are not somehow obligated to license their
patents on reasonable terms.").
85. The formation of standard-setting organizations ("SSO") reduces the risk of
this sort of industry-wide holdup by requiring market participants to agree to license
any relevant patents they may have on "reasonable terms" before they are allowed to
adopt the standard. Id. Nevertheless, SSO formation creates its own opportunities for
strategic behavior: "patent holders [can] assert that at least some of their patents are
not in fact essential, but perhaps merely extremely helpful, in complying with the
standard" and thus "can in principle either refuse to license its patent to others (especially once the standard has become established, and perhaps for a patent that issued
after the standard is established) or seek something more than 'fair and reasonable'
royalties." Id.at 147 n.25.
86. ProbabilisticPatents, supra note 69, at 78 n.2.
87. Id.at 78 ("If the applicant is dissatisfied with the claims allowed by the patent examiner, the applicant can file a continuation application even after receiving a
patent and thus continue to seek a patent with broader claims.... Applicants are even
allowed to amend their applications to capture products that are appearing in the market, so long as they (arguably) stay within the bounds of the invention described in the
initial application, which can be broad and rather vague." (internal citation omitted)).
See generally Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, EndingAbuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63 (2004) [hereinafter Ending Abuse] (discussing the
abuse of continuation applications and noting that over half of all litigated patents
issue from continuation applications).
88. EndingAbuse, supra note 87, at 64.
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competitor's product from the market; nor is it in any manner improper to amend or insert claims intended to cover a competitor's
product the applicant's attorney has learned about during the prosecution of a patent application.89

IV. INNOCENT INFRINGERS CANNOT BE DETERRED
Now that we have seen that the patent system incorporates a number of
deterrents that ensure infringers will not have an incentive to misappropriate
patent rights, one question remains: is it possible that the patent system nevertheless benefits from the additional deterrence provided by inflated damages
awards? This Part shows that, even if additional deterrence would be beneficial, royalty premiums are an ineffective means for providing that deterrence
because reasonable royalty law applies to all infringers, innocent and blatant
alike.
A. Ignorance Is No Defense - But Should Be
It goes without saying that, regardless of the punishment imposed, it is
impossible to deter someone who does not know he or she is committing a
wrongful act. 90 Likewise, no matter what remedies a patentee might win in
litigation, the patent system will never be able to deter infringers who are
unaware they are using patented technology. 91
In fact, there is good reason to believe that truly innocent infringers
should face no damages whatsoever - let alone enhanced damages. Starting
from the premise that patentees should be rewarded with some share of the

89. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 874 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (en banc).
90. To be sure, punishment might incentivize individuals to learn what acts the
punishing authority deems wrongful. After all, it is a "venerable principle that ignorance of the law generally is no defense." Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 13536 (1994). But this principle applies only to the extent that the scope of what is
wrongful is, in fact, discemable and available for public consumption. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (holding that a traditional
vagrancy law was "void for vagueness"). As discussed infra, determining the scope
of patent rights is virtually impossible because patent disclosures are incredibly difficult to interpret.
91. Judge Nies recognized this, stating in dissent on more than one occasion,
"An infringement, like a trespass, may be committed unknowingly. In such situations, the amount of damages manifestly can have no effect to deter an unknowing
infringer." Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies,
J. dissenting); see also King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 959 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (Nies, J. dissenting) ("In any event, where infringement is innocent as here, the
amount of damages cannot operate as a 'deterrent,' except as a brake to legitimate
challenges to a charge of infringement.").
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benefit their inventions confer on technology users, 92 it follows that patentees
should not be permitted to recover damages from those who independently
invent the same technology. When two inventors make the same discovery
independent of the efforts of one another, "each inventor's social contribution
...is nil: the invention would have been available to society even if [one]
inventor had not discovered the invention." 93 Therefore, the appropriate reward for the patent-holding inventor equals the value he or she contributed to
the non-patent holder: nil.
Accordingly, to avoid stifling the innovative efforts of good faith inventors, any deterrence scheme must, at a minimum, differentiate between innocent and deliberate infringement. Courts that deter with enhanced royalties
fail to make this distinction. Unlike exemplary damages awarded under the
willfulness doctrine, which apply only to those who blatantly misappropriate
another's patented invention, 94 reasonable royalty damages fall on all infringers - innocents and pirates alike. 95 When courts levy inflated royalties, they
set precedent opening the door for enhanced awards against infringers of all
stripes.

92. See, e.g., Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, supra note 18, at 1999-2000
(defining benchmark-level compensation as a division of the value created by the
patented invention).
93. Patent Reform, supra note 5, at 116; see also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Reply, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2163, 2166 (2007)
("[P]atent holders are generally overrewarded in situations where other parties independently achieve the same (or a similar) invention at roughly the same time ....
[because] the patent holder's social contribution does not include use of the patented
invention by the party that independently achieved the same invention."); Landers,
supra note 2, at 371 ("Arguably, deterrence damages should not be awarded at all
where infringement is truly innocent, based on the Federal Circuit's rule that 'royalties, like lost profits are compensatory damages, not punitive.' Deterrence damages
where an infringer could not possibly be aware that its conduct is wrongful appears
[sic] to impose unwarranted costs on an infringer." (quoting Integra Lifesciences 1,
Ltd. v. Merk KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 870 (Fed. Cir. 2003), rev'd on other grounds,
Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005))).
94. See Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems Indus. Prods., Inc., 897 F.2d 508, 511
(Fed. Cir. 1990) ("[A] party cannot be found to have 'willfully' infringed a patent of
which the party had no knowledge.").
95. This would not be the case if U.S. patent law included an independent invention defense. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Prior User Rights, AM. ECON. REV., May 2006,
at 92, 92 [hereinafter PriorUse Rights] (arguing in favor of an independent invention
defense); Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475 (2006) (arguing in favor of an independent invention
defense). But cf Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of
Copying?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1525, 1527-32 (2007) [hereinafter Proof of Copying?]
(expressing some concern about independent invention as a total defense to infringement).
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B. Most Infringement Is Innocent Infringement
Furthermore, innocent infringement is anything but rare. Indeed, there
is good reason to believe that the lion's share of infringement is innocent - at
least as a practical matter.
1. No One Reads Patents - And for Good Reason
First, contrary to the ideals upon which the patent system is founded,96
savvy players in the technology world do not read patents. 97 In fact, the patent system virtually ensures that the potential costs associated with reading
patents far outweigh the benefits. 98 Knowledge of a patent exposes a patent
reader to the possibility of paying exemplary damages under the willfulness
doctrine should that patent ever be asserted against it in court. To avoid becoming a willful infringer, the reader "must spend tens of thousands of dollars to obtain an opinion, then forego some or possibly all of its attorneyclient privilege with respect to the evaluation of the patent (and possibly with

96. At its core, the patent system is a trade-off encouraging inventors to share
their inventions with the public, rather than conceal them as trade secrets, in exchange
for the exclusive right to practice the invention for a fixed period of time. See, e.g.,
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002)
("[E]xclusive patent rights are given in exchange for disclosing the invention to the
public."). This balance between public benefit and private reward is undermined
when patents fail to carry out their disclosure function. See Lemley & Tangri, supra
note 14, at 1100 ("Although patent policy presumes that the public learns from patents, the willfulness game creates a strong incentive not to read patents.").
97. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21-22
[hereinafter Ignoring Patents] (noting that companies generally ignore patents in all
stages of product development: when conducting research and design, when filing
their own patents, when launching new products, and even after receiving initial
cease-and-desist letters from patent owners). There are, of course, some notable exceptions. Jack Kilby, co-inventor of the integrated circuit, is said to have read every
new patent issued during many years of his career. T.R. REID, THE CHIP: How Two
AMERICANS INVENTED THE MICROCHIP AND LAUNCHED A REVOLUTION 65 (Random
House 2001) (1985).
98. Very little empirical evidence exists relating to patent readership. In a 2003
Intellectual Property Owners Association survey of sixty-six senior corporate IP managers, only 35% of respondents reported that they "always do a patent search before
initiating any R&D or product development effort[,]" and only 26% of respondents
reported ever deciding to abandon promising technology because of adverse patent
rights. IAN M. COCKBURN & REBECCA HENDERSON, SURVEY RESULTS FROM THE
2003 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION SURVEY ON STRATEGIC

D.2, F.6 (Oct. 2003), available at
http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&Template=/CM/ContentDispl
MANAGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

ay.cfm&ContentlD=22949.
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respect to the eventual litigation concerning it, too)." 99 It is not surprising,
then, that on the advice of their patent counsel, companies regularly instruct
their scientists and engineers not to read patents.' °0 Further, the sheer number
of patents issued each year alone would make the task of identifying and digesting relevant patents nothing short of Herculean. Each year, over 150,000
patents issue, and over 450,000 new applications are filed. 01 To monitor
every new patent that might cover some aspect of its products, a potential
infringer would have to review at least the many thousands of patents issued
in its industry each year, not to mention all such patents that issued from applications filed in the previous twenty years. 102
In exchange for this substantial cost, a company is likely to get very little value from a patent monitoring program. Ultimately, only about 1.5% of
all patents are ever asserted in litigation, and approximately half of the patents litigated to a final determination are found invalid. 10 3 Also, between
99. Lemley & Tangri, supra note 14, at 1100.
100. See id. at 1100-01 (footnote omitted) ("[I]n-house patent counsel and many
outside lawyers regularly advise their clients not to read patents if there is any way to
avoid it. What you do know will certainly harm you, they reason, so it is generally
better not to know."); see also FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 29 (2003) ("[F]ear
of willfulness charges discourages inventors from reading others' patents, thereby
undermining the disclosure function of the patent system."), available at
http://www2.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf; Ignoring Patents, supra note 97,
at 21; Prior User Rights, supra note 95, at 95 ("The effectiveness of patent disclosures is in doubt, however, especially in industries where scientists and engineers are
instructed not to read patents for fear of triggering liability for willful infringement.").
101. In 2008, the PTO issued 154,699 new utility patents, U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 119, tbl.6 (2008),
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2008/2008annual
report.pdf, and applicants filed 464,541 new utility patent applications, id at 116,
tbl.2; see also Probabilistic Patents, supra note 69, at 77 ("Inventors file over'
350,000 patent applications a year with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO),
a number that has grown steadily, and spend over $5 billion a year just on the process
of obtaining those patents. The PTO grants nearly 200,000 new patents a year, a
number that has roughly doubled over the past 15 years." (citing statistics from 2003)
(citations omitted)).
102. Cf Navigating the Patent Thicket, supra note 84, at 125 ("[l]n industries
such as semiconductors ... many thousands of patents are issued each year and manufacturers can potentially infringe on hundreds of patents with a single product.").
For patent applications filed on or after June 8, 1995, the patent term is twenty years
from the date of filing. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). Patents in force on June 8,
1995, and patents issued from applications pending on that date are entitled to a term
of seventeen years from issue or twenty years from filing, whichever is longer. Id. §
154(c)(1).
103. ProbabilisticPatents, supra note 69, at 79 ("Only 1.5 percent of all patents
are ever litigated, and only 0.1 percent are litigated to trial .... ). See supra note 70
and accompanying text.
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55% and 67% of all issued patents prematurely lapse into the public domain
for failure to pay PTO maintenance fees.1° 4 Accordingly, the likelihood that a
company will be accused of infringing any given patent is quite low, and,
therefore, the expected value of the future injury averted by reading that patent is likewise miniscule.10 5 Furthermore, even if a company believed it had
the logistical capacity to review all relevant patents in hopes of avoiding infringement, it is unlikely the company would be able to say with any certainty
whether it infringes most relevant patents.' 0 6 It is extraordinarily difficult to
decipher the meaning of patent claims. 107 The scope of patent claims is almost always fiercely contested between parties in patent litigation,'0 8 and,
even after the court issues a claim construction ruling, the "doctrine of equivalents" sometimes permits patent claims to expand beyond their literal

104. ProbabilisticPatents,supra note 69, at 80.

105. As immortalized in Judge Learned Hand's "Hand Test" for determining the
standard of care in tort law, a rational actor will only take a precaution if the magnitude of the harm averted (discounted by its likelihood of occurring) exceeds the burden of taking the precaution. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169,
173 (2d Cir. 1947) ("[I]f the probability [of inflicting some injury] be called P; the
injury, L; and the burden [of preventing the injury] B; liability depends upon whether
B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B [<] PL."). In the patent infringement
context, this calculus is especially skewed against taking precaution (i.e., reading
patents) because the cost of monitoring for infringement risks includes not only the
labor cost associated with searching for and reading patents but also the risk of becoming a willful infringer by virtue of having read the patent in the first place.
106. To be sure, companies might be motivated to review patents by a desire to
learn something new and useful, rather than solely by a desire to avoid infringement.
The arguments that follow seriously undermine the informational value of patents in
both respects - as a means of conveying new ideas and as a means of delineating the
scope of those ideas.
107. See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
("[D]etermining when a patented device has been 'designed around' enough to avoid
infringement is a difficult determination to make. One cannot know for certain that
changes are sufficient to avoid infringement until a judge or a jury has made that
determination."); Landers, supra note 2, at 341 ("Asking potential infringers to assess
whether a particular patent is infringed is complicated because of the difficulty of
determining a patent's scope in advance of a court ruling."). Burk and Lemley suggest that the current claim construction process is so indeterminate that the United
States should consider re-adopting the late nineteenth century practice of treating
patent claims as disclosing only the "central" features of the patented invention, rather
than delineating the absolute "peripheral" boundaries of the patentee's rights. Dan L.
Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743 (2009).
108. ProbabilisticPatents, supra note 69, at 85 ("The meaning of patent claim
terms - called 'claim construction' - is hotly debated in virtually every patent case,
and courts have found ambiguity even in such innocuous terms as 'a,' 'or,' 'to' and
'when."').

HeinOnline -- 74 Mo. L. Rev. 938 2009

2009]

THE MISUSE OF REASONABLE ROYALTYDAMAGES

939

meaning. 10 9 Further, and perhaps most telling of all, district courts err in
construing claims over a third of the time - at least according to the Federal
Circuit. 10 If these courts - which construe only a select few claims 11 ' and do
so with the benefit of extensive (and expensive) briefing, oral argument from
the parties, and expert witnesses - cannot get it right, what chance does a
potential infringer tasked with monitoring thousands of patents have?
Moreover, even if patent claims were always written in the plainest language, no amount of analysis can protect a company from later-filed submarine claims. As discussed above, continuation applications allow patentees to
add new claims to issued patents (provided those claims find support in the

initial disclosure) - a practice frequently used to capture new products introduced by competitors.' 12 There is no limit on the number of continuations a
patentee can file, and it is not rare for a savvy patentee to keep a continuation

application pending for the full term of its initial patent." 13 Accordingly, no
matter how proactive a potential infringer may be or how sure he or she is
that her product does not fall within the scope of issued patent claims, the
potential infringer can never be sure whether some "patentee has a continua114
tion application waiting in the wings" to capture his or her design.

109. Id. at 85-86; Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,
608 (1950) (holding that, even without literal infringement, "a patentee may invoke
[the] doctrine [of equivalents] to proceed against the producer of a device 'if it performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same
result."' (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929))).
110. Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction
More Predictable?,9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 233 (2005) (finding that the Federal Circuit reversed 34.5% of district court claim construction rulings appealed between 1996 and 2003). See also Christian A. Chu, EmpiricalAnalysis of the Federal
Circuit's Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001)
(reporting similar numbers); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped
to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 11 (2001). For more on the difficulties courts face construing patents, see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 29 (2005) and Robert P. Merges &
Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
839 (1990).
111. In the interest of efficiency, courts can limit the number of claims a patentee
may assert in one case. See Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure, Inc., No.
9:07CV104, 2008 WL 2485426, at *1 (E.D. Tex. June 13, 2008) (limiting the parties
to "no more than three (3) representative claims from each patent for claim construction and trial").
112. ProbabilisticPatents,supra note 69, at 78-79.
113. Id. at 78, 81.
114. Id. at 82. Indeed, as Lemley and Shapiro note, "some unscrupulous patentees
intentionally delay the issuance of their patents to take other firms by surprise, increasing their royalty rates once companies operating in the industry have made irreversible investments." Id.
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2. Independent Invention Is the Rule, Not the Exception
In addition to widespread rational ignorance among potential infringers,
empirical evidence and the prevalence of near simultaneous invention suggest
that truly independent invention, rather than copying, is the norm. 1 5 Patentees accuse defendants of copying their inventions in a mere 11% of patent
cases and actually prove that copying occurred only 2% of the time.116 Outside the pharmaceutical and chemical industries, copying allegations are particularly rare. Less than 3% of cases involving computer or software technology include allegations of copying, and less than 1% ultimately lead to
proof of copying.117
Moreover, contrary to popular belief, near simultaneous invention is
quite common 18 - and not just for minor improvements, which require relatively little effort and insight on the inventor's part." 9 Many of the most
heralded inventions of all time were, in fact, independently invented by multiple competitors at virtually the same time. 12 Examples include the light

bulb (Edison vs. Swan), the telephone (Bell vs. Gray), the integrated circuit
(Kilby vs. Noyce), 121 television (Zworykin vs. Farnsworth), 122 and the laser

115. See Vermont, supra note 95, at 479 ("Some historians and philosophers of
science believe convergence is the rule rather than the exception." (citing DAVID
LAMB & SUSAN M. EASTON, MULTIPLE DISCOVERY: THE PATTERN OF SCIENTIFIC

(1984); Robert K. Merton, Singletons and Multiples in Scientific Discovery: A Chapterin the Sociology of Science, 105 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC'Y 470 (1961))).
PROGRESS

116. Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C.
L. REV. 1421, 1424, 1441 (studying "allegations of copying [made in] a sample of
200 patent infringement complaints filed between January 1, 2000 and May 1, 2007,
100 each from.., the District of Delaware and the Eastern District of Texas" - and a
set of 1871 reported patent infringement opinions).
117. Id. at 1424.
118. See Vermont, supra note 95, at 478 ("Researchers frequently converge on the
same idea at roughly the same time."); Lemley & Tangri, supra note 14, at 1121
("Our anecdotal experience in litigation suggests that a significant number, perhaps
even a majority, of all patent cases involve independent development.").
119. See Prior User Rights, supra note 95, at 92 ("Independent invention is common for minor technological improvements.").
120. See Vermont, supra note 95, at 478-79.
121. Id. at 478-79; Patent Reform, supra note 5, at 127. See also Prior User
Rights, supra note 95, at 92; REID, supra note 97 (documenting the near simultaneous
independent invention of the integrated circuit by Jack Kilby (September 1958) and
Robert Noyce (January 1959) and the ensuing litigation between Texas Instruments
and Fairchild Semiconductor over patent rights to the invention).
122. See SAMUEL HANDEL, THE ELECTRONIC REVOLUTION 68-72 (1967) (documenting the 1920s competition between Vladimir Zworykin and Philo T. Farnsworth
to perfect black and white television); see also REID, supra note 97, at 214-15.

HeinOnline -- 74 Mo. L. Rev. 940 2009

2009]

THE MISUSE OFREASONABLE ROYALTY DAMAGES

941

(Gould vs. Townes and Schawlow).1 23 Even the general theory of relativity perhaps the single greatest scientific discovery of the last three hundred years
(though not patentable subject matter) - was arguably first completed and
submitted for publication by German mathematician David Hilbert five days
before Albert Einstein submitted his own work on November 25, 1915.124
Although you might not find names like Swan, Gray, and Hilbert in many
history texts (unrivaled brilliance makes for better storytelling, after all), their
forgotten achievements underscore the point that much technological breakthrough is really the inevitable result of long-building inertia, rather than sin25
gular strokes of genius.'

V. HEADS-I-LOSE, TAILS-YOU-WIN:
PATENT CHALLENGES AS PUBLIC GOODS
This Article has shown that inflated royalties make poor deterrents but
has so far set aside the question of whether the patent system nevertheless
benefits from the marginal deterrence they do provide. So, when it comes to
infringement deterrence, is more better? This Part shows that, to the contrary,
there is good reason to believe that existing deterrents already go too far.
Good faith patent challenges generate positive externalities. When an
accused infringer successfully limits, invalidates, or renders a patent unenforceable in litigation, all market participants benefit because they are free to
use the invention without restriction. 12 6 This quality of challenging patents,
123. See NICK TAYLOR, LASER: THE INVENTOR, THE NOBEL LAUREATE, AND THE

THIRTY-YEAR PATENT WAR (2000) (documenting the independent invention of the
laser by Gordon Gould (November 1957) and Charles Townes and Arthur Schawlow
(February 1958) and ensuing litigation over patent rights to the invention).
Vermont lists even more examples, including "calculus (Newton and Leibniz), the
periodic table (Mendeleyev and Meyer), the telegraph (Morse, Henry, and Cooke and
Wheatstone), [and] the telescope (Hans Lippershey, Drebbel, Fontana, Jansen, Metius, and Galileo - each claiming they invented it in 1608 or 1609)." Vermont, supra
note 95, at 479. Lemley does as well: "the steamboat, which was patented by different inventors in different states; the airplane, which was first patented by the Wrights
but independently developed and significantly improved upon by Glenn Curtis and
others; . . .and polypropylene, which was the subject of a 30-year interference between competing inventors." Proof of Copying?, supra note 95, at 1528 (footnote
omitted).
124. See Leo Corry, Jfirgen Renn & John Stachel, BelatedDecision in the HilbertEinstein PriorityDispute,278 SCI. 1270 (1997).
125. Cf Patent Reform, supra note 5, at 127 (noting that "in rapidly advancing
fields such as information technology and biotechnology, .. .many applied ideas
flowing from basic research are 'in the air' at any given time").
126. See id. at 119. This is particularly true when competitors have already entered into licenses with a patentee and, thus, are freed from their obligation to pay
royalties if the accused rival successfully invalidates the patent-at-issue. See id. at
119-20. Even when an infringer loses in litigation, other market participants benefit
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however, ensures that patent challenges will be undersupplied in the marketplace.' 27 Patent challenges are public goods 12 and, like all public goods, are
subject to free-riding: the infringer defending against a claim of infringement
bears the cost of litigation - attorneys' fees and, if unsuccessful, damages but shares the benefit of victory with its competitors and, really, with society
129
as a whole.

Thus, even without deterrents of any kind, accused infringers will naturally tend to license asserted patents, rather than fight them in court.1 30 And

from information generated during the case (e.g., the court's claim construction order), which serves to clarify the bounds of patentee's monopoly. See Probabilistic
Patents,supra note 69, at 76.
127. See Patent Reform, supra note 5, at 119; ProbabilisticPatents, supra note
69, at 88; Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend
Patents: Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 958 (2004) ("[A]

challenger bears the cost of litigation but its rivals and downstream buyers will capture almost all the benefits of successful challenge .... ").
128. See ProbabilisticPatents, supra note 69, at 87-88 (providing a mathematical

example).
129. In addition to benefiting consumers as a whole by reducing the cost of existing goods and services, eliminating patents also benefits society by increasing incentives to develop improvements to existing technology. A proliferation of patents in
one industry - known as a "patent thicket" - reduces overall innovation and the introduction of new products by requiring those who wish to commercialize new technology to obtain multiple licenses from multiple patent owners. Navigating the Patent
Thicket, supra note 84, at 119-20. Paying the numerous royalties required to enter the
market "necessarily reduces the return to new product design and development, and
thus can easily be a drag on innovation and commercialization of new technologies."
Id. at 124. See also Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 843 (1990) ("[A] patent's social

costs should include its potential to reduce competition in the market for improvements to the patented technology."). Indeed, in some industries there may be so many
patents that companies hoping to introduce a new product may (as a practical matter)
never be able to license all relevant patent ights from their various owners. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transitionfrom
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); Ignoring Patents,supra note 97, at

19-20 (noting that this patent law "anticommons" might be "a particular problem for
semiconductor, telecommunications, and software companies, which must aggregate
hundreds or thousands of different components to make an integrated product"); Michael A. Heller, Where Are the Cures? How Patent Gridlock Is Blocking the Development of Lifesaving Drugs, FORBES, Aug. 11, 2008, at 30 available at

http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2008/0811/030.html; Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anti-Commons in Biomedical Re-

search, 280 SCl. 698 (1998).
130. In fact, this is true even when free riding is not a problem. Were potential
infringers to take collective action against infringement threats, their ability to pass
through to consumers (at least a portion of) uniform royalty costs in the form of high-
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because the benefits of patent challenges, but not patent licenses, spill over to
others, accused infringers' reluctance to fight back reduces social welfare and
increases opportunities for holdup by artificially extending the life of weak
and abused patents.' 3 1 Deterrents only serve to exacerbate this problem by
increasing the expected cost of patent challenges and thereby making patent
challenges even less likely. Accordingly, from an economic standpoint, there
is good reason to believe that, in order to achieve an economically efficient
level of patent challenges, society should not deter but actually encourage
potential infringers
to defend themselves in good faith against infringement
32
allegations. 1
VI. PATENT REFORM MEASURES
So far this Article has shown that, as a method for deterring patent inflingement, inflated reasonable royalty awards are both unnecessary - in light
of the willfulness doctrine, attorneys' fee awards, permanent injunctions, and
many other factors - and poorly targeted, because they fail to differentiate
between ordinary, innocent infringers and willful copyists. This Part addresses how patent damages law might be modified to focus an appropriate
amount of deterrence where it is needed, while eliminating the threat entirely
where it will only do harm. Specifically, this Part proposes that courts adopt
a bifurcated damages system designed to deter only deliberate copyists.
A. Carve Out OrdinaryInfringers
First, when it comes to deterrence, the law of patent damages should
strictly differentiate between "ordinary" infringers and blatant copyists. As
we have seen, to the extent deterrence has a legitimate role to play in the patent system, the means for creating that deterrence should not burden innocent
infringers, who cannot be deterred in the first place. We have also seen that,
er prices would still skew their incentive to litigate. See Farrell & Merges, supra note
127, at 953-54.
131. See generally Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, How Strong Are Weak Patents?, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 1347 (2008) (using a game theoretic model to show how
weak patents can be used to extract royalties that exceed their social value); Jay P.
Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why "Bad" Patents Survive in the Market and How
Should We Change? The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61, 7795 (2006).
132. See Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1560 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (not-

ing that, although patent damages must be sufficient to compensate a patentee, "the
public interest requires that there be a real opportunity to test the grants made by the
Patent Office, without fear of a ruinous penalty for asserting a position taken in good
faith" (quoting R.A. White & L.F. Lynch, Winning the Last Battle - The Recovery of
Actual Damages in Patent Infringement, PAT. L. ANN. 35, 36 (1970))). Blatant in-

fringers who have no good faith defense are a different story. See infra Part VI.B.
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at least as a practical matter, the lion's share of infringement is the result of
good faith, independent research conducted by
individuals and companies
33
unaware of the adverse patent rights of others.1
These ordinary infringers should not have to fear the prospect of paying
exemplary damages of any sort, let alone inflated royalties. Instead, consistent with the Patent Act itself and traditional notions of patent damages, ordinary infringers should only be required to compensate the patentee on par
with the royalty fee the parties would have privately negotiated in the marketplace (or, when relevant, for the profits the patentee lost on sales diverted
to the infringer 134). 135 In the royalty context, this means allowing ordinary
infringers to share the economic gains created by the patented invention. To
accomplish this, the Federal Circuit must first turn back the clock on the law
of reasonable royalty damages more than twenty years to a time when courts
recognized that reasonable royalties must reserve some expectation of profit
for the infringer' 36 and mirrored actual practice in the marketplace by honoring established industry royalty rates.' 37 At the very least, courts should initiate efforts to tame large jury awards that are punitive on their face - for
example, by prohibiting awards that clearly exceed any reasonable estimate
of the profit (or worse yet, total
sales price) an infringer expected to make on
38
sales of infringing products.1
Awarding damages that merely compensate for ordinary infringement
further requires that courts abstain from applying doctrines that substantially
increase the pecuniary burden placed on infringers - in particular, permanent
133. This group also includes infringers who, though aware of the patentee's
rights, made a good faith effort to design around the patentee's claims. As discussed
supra at Part IV.B.1, it is virtually impossible to determine the scope of patent claims,
and potential infringers always remain vulnerable to later-filed claims in continuation
applications.
134. Nothing in this Article is meant to suggest that manufacturing patentees
should not be compensated for sales they lose to infringers. For more on the intersection of lost profits and reasonable royalty damages, see DistinguishingLost Profits,
supra note 2.
135. The patent system might further place near-simultaneous independent inventors - who lack even constructive notice of a patentee's rights - into a third group
subject to no damages whatsoever. See Vermont, supra note 95, at 475 (arguing that
the patent system should incorporate an independent invention defense, "provided the
independent inventor creates the invention before receiving actual or constructive
notice that someone else already created it"). Lemley is not yet convinced and suggests less radical reforms, including reform of the willfulness doctrine. Proofof Copying?, supra note 95, at 1533. For purposes of this Article, I argue only that ordinary
infringers should be spared punitive awards and remain agnostic on the merits of
additionally incorporating an independent invention defense.
136. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
138. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(Nies, J., dissenting).
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injunctions and doctrines like the entire market value rule - when patentees
are entitled only to reasonable royalty damages. To be sure, permanent injunctions and other market-exclusion remedies like the entire market value
rule can serve a legitimate function when the patentee is a market participant
losing sales to the infringers. 139 However, when a patentee does no more than
hold intellectual property rights, these remedies serve little purpose other than
to keep valuable technology out of society's reach while rewarding the patentee in excess of the true value of its invention. 140 At a minimum, courts
should stay the execution of permanent injunctions for a reasonable period of
4
time during which the infringer may design around the asserted patent.1 '
Nevertheless, I recognize that at least some modicum of inflation is necessary in the ordinary infringement context, if only to level the playing field
and prevent a patentee from having to bear the cost of uncertainty in its patent
rights twice: once when negotiating with the accused infringer and again at
trial. 142 For this reason, any reforms designed to lighten the burden on ordinary infringers should spare the rule requiring courts to assume that the patent-at-issue is valid and infringed when setting a reasonable royalty rate.

139. See DistinguishingLost Profits, supra note 2, at 9 ("The logic of the entire
market value rule breaks down in reasonable royalty cases.., because we're no longer talking about the defendant taking a sale away from the plaintiff."); Patent Holdup
and Royalty Stacking, supra note 18, at 2036 ("In cases involving significant lost
profits, we favor a presumption that the patent holder will be granted a permanent
injunction .... in part for reasons of equity and in part because of the grave difficulties associated with calculating and awarding lost profits on an ongoing basis. Similarly, a patentee who assigns or exclusively licenses its patent to someone who competes significantly against the infringing firm also should ordinarily be entitled to an
injunction.").
140. See Love, supra note 77, at 278-80; Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking,
supra note 18, at 2009-10.
141. See Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, supra note 18, at 2035-39 (making
this proposal).
142. If parties bargaining for patent rights know ex ante that, if litigation ensues, a
court will award damages discounted by the pre-litigation risk that the patent-at-issue
might have been invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed, those parties will reach a
bargain doubly discounted by that risk. See BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 14, at 230.
Mathematically, if a court's award A is given by nominal damages amount D discounted by risk 0 (i.e., A = O*D), the patentee's ex ante expected recovery from
litigation (taking risk 0 into account) is O*A, and the accused infringer will settle ex
ante for an amount S that is no more than the expected cost of litigation (which excluding attorneys' fees is equal to the patentee's expected recovery O*A), then settlement amount S will be at most nominal damages amount D twice discounted by
risk 0 (i.e., S < O*A = 0*(O*D) = 0 2 D).
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B. Single Out Blatant Copyists
For bad faith copyists - infringers who are aware of patent rights and
make little or no effort to design around those rights - deterrence is in order. 143 However, such infringers are already subject to exemplary damages
under the willfulness doctrine and attorneys' fee awards (not to mention permanent injunctions prohibiting their use of the patented invention). To the
extent these deterrents fail to provide an appropriate level of punishment,
patent reform should focus on modifying those doctrines. There is simply no
good reason for courts to turn to the reasonable royalty measure of damages
to make up the difference. Reasonable royalty precedent is applicable to all
infringers, and, regardless of a court's original intent, it is reasonable to assume that case law approving inflated royalty awards will ultimately be used
to extract excessive payments from undeserving, innocent infringers. Moreover, using multiple deterrents unnecessarily complicates144what is already a
complex and unpredictable system for awarding damages.
An ideal system for deterring technology pirates would (i) provide an efficient level of deterrence 45 and (ii) do so in a clear, standardized way that
would allow parties to easily assess their potential liability and plan accordingly. 46 As Lemley and Tangri suggest, one way to modify patent law's
built-in deterrents to meet these goals is to merge the willfulness doctrine and
attorneys' fee awards into a single
deterrent for punishing those who delibe1 47
rately copy patented inventions.
143. Bad faith patent challenges, which by definition are almost certain to fail, are
not likely to produce the positive externalities discussed supra at Part V. Instead,
such challenges result in little more than the wasteful expenditure of litigation resources.
144. Landers, supra note 2, at 307 (comparing the law of patent damages to "a
Las Vegas casino").
145. Achieving an optimal level of deterrence by imposing fines or punitive damages is a well-studied area of the law and economics literature. See, e.g., A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 869 (1998).
146. See Landers, supra note 2, at 372-73 (stressing the importance of clarity and
standardization in crafting reform proposals for patent damages).
147. As currently defined, willfulness is not strictly limited to deliberate copyists
(though it once was). See Lemley & Tangri, supra note 14, at 1119 ("[B]efore the
creation of the Federal Circuit, willful infringement meant deliberate copying, not
continued use of an independently created invention."). For example, because willfulness can attach at any time, a truly independent inventor may become a willful
infringer simply by continuing to sell a product after learning that the product might
infringe a patent. Lemley and Tangri studied this issue and recommend that willfulness be redefined to attach only at the time a potential infringer adopts a product. Id.
at 1117-21. Recently introduced patent reform legislation promises to codify the
willfulness doctrine and essentially limit it to deliberate copyists - i.e., those infringers who lack an "informed good faith belief that the patent was invalid or unenforcea-
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An efficient level of deterrence is one that ensures deliberate copyists
will ultimately find themselves in a worse position for having copied, while
also ensuring that patentees do not wind up worse off as a result of the infringer's actions. 148 Thus, merely making the patentee whole in individual
cases will not achieve optimal deterrence because copyists will, from time to
time, get away with infringement by evading detection altogether or by harming a patentee who for one reason or another is unable to prevail in litigation. 149 Accordingly, the optimal amount of damages to award for willful
infringement - i.e., the willfulness penalty (WP) - is given by the equation
15
"WP = ((gains from infringement) x (1/probability of detection)) + 1. 0
Unfortunately, setting damages at this optimal level is easier said than
done. It is unlikely that a court will be able to determine the "probability of
detection" with any degree of accuracy in most cases, and the current practice
of simply choosing an arbitrary whole number multiplier is even less likely to
produce desirable results. The current convention of trebling damages for
willfulness essentially incorporates a blanket assumption into willfulness
awards that infringement goes undetected two-thirds of the time. Although
selecting this rate of detection might approximate optimal deterrence for anti15 1
trust conspiracies (another area of the law authorizing treble damages),
which by definition are secret agreements engineered to deceive other market
participants, using this level of penalty in patent law leads to over deterrence
in the vast majority of patent infringement cases, which involve infringing
products that (far from being hidden) were aggressively marketed and sold on

ble" and act with "objective recklessness" after receiving specific, written notice from
the patentee. S. 515, 1l1th Cong. § § 1(a), 4(a) (2009) ("Patent Reform Act of
2009"). 1 fully embrace these reforms. My recommendations in this Part assume a
willfulness doctrine that applies strictly to intentional copyists.
148. Lemley & Tangri, supra note 14, at 1123. Lemley and Tangri recognize that
their proposal interprets sections 284 and 285 of the Patent Act as authorizing the
same remedy but respond that this result is not particularly troubling because the two
sections have distinct purposes: section 284 deters blatant infringement, while section
285 deters forcing litigation without a reasonable defense. Id. at 1124. 1 have no
problem with this result. Under this interpretation, section 285 exists as a deterrent
only in rare instances when an infringer lacks a good faith defense but is not a deliberate copyist.
149. Id.at 1123.
150. Id.
151. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006) (Clayton Act § 4); see also United States v.
Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915) (noting that a conspiracy to violate the law "is
characterized by secrecy, rendering it difficult of detection, requiring more time for its
discovery, and adding to the importance of punishing it when discovered"); United
States v. Sasson, 62 F.3d 874, 888 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Because of the secretive character
of conspiracies, direct evidence is elusive ...." (quoting United States v. Perry, 747

F.2d 1165, 1169 (7th Cir. 1984))).
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the open market.152 This excessive deterrence stifles innovation, increases
patent holdup, and further undermines the patent system's notice function by
discouraging scientists and engineers from reading applications.
Awarding patentees their attorneys' fees for deliberate infringement offers the best of both worlds. It helps ensure that patentees are made whole by
offsetting a sizeable cost they would otherwise have to bear, while also providing a material pecuniary deterrent to copying that litigants can estimate
thanks to empirical evidence available on fee amounts. 53 Thus, by making
changes to more efficiently utilize existing deterrents, courts can provide the
deterrence they feel is necessary without negatively impacting the inventive
efforts of good faith inventors - all with the added benefit of simplifying patent damages.

VII. CONCLUSION
The recent history of the reasonable royalty measure of damages is one
in which courts have increasingly abandoned compensatory principles in favor of fashioning a catch-all remedy incorporating aspects of lost profits
damages and the willfulness penalty. But there are many good reasons why
reasonable royalties, lost profits, and willfulness each developed as a distinct
doctrine. Not all infringers and patentees are created equal, and thus no single measure of damages can provide an appropriate level of reward in all
situations.
Though there is a place for deterrence in the patent system, that place is
not reasonable royalty damages. Deterrents like the willfulness doctrine already exist to discourage blatant copying of others' technology, and punitive
awards simply do no good when levied against ordinary infringers who already have sufficient incentive to stay far away from patent litigation. Accordingly, courts must resist the urge to use the flexible reasonable royalty
standard as an indiscriminate bludgeon and instead make efforts to reform
existing deterrents to the extent willful technology copyists escape penalty.
The result will be increased efficiency, less uncertainty, and - most importantly - more innovation.

152. See Lemley & Tangri, supra note 14, at 1123-24 n. 116 (making this point).
To be sure, there may be some cases where evidence of deception on the infringer's
part warrants additional damages - for example, where the infringed invention is a
manufacturing process not easily reverse-engineered from resulting products or where
the infringer attempts to pass off its own infringing goods as though they were the
patentee's. See id.
153. For example, the American Intellectual Property Law Association issues a
biennial report on the cost of patent litigation. For the latest report, see AM. INTELL.
PROP. LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY 2007.

HeinOnline -- 74 Mo. L. Rev. 948 2009

